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Abstract
This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sens (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker
notions of truth-telling. It models individual is honesty standard as a prole of (pos-
sibly non-empty) collections of ordered pairs of outcomes, one for each member of
society, over which individual i feels truth-telling concerns. Individual i is honest
provided that she states her true preferences as well as rankings (not necessarily com-
plete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences of individuals in her
honesty standard. Under this notion of honesty, we o¤er a condition, called S(N)-
partial-honesty monotonicity, which is necessary for Nash implementation when there
are partially-honest agents. In an independent domain of preferences, we show that
this condition is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity provided that honesty means sta-
ting the orderings of individuals (in a honesty standard) truthfully and individuals
honesty standards are non-connected.
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1. Introduction
The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism or game form
with the property that for each prole of participantspreferences, the equilibrium outcomes
of the mechanism played with those preferences coincide with the recommendations that a
given social choice rule (SCR) would prescribe for that prole. If that mechanism design
exercise can be accomplished, the SCR is said to be implementable. The fundamental paper
on implementation in Nash equilibrium is thanks to Maskin (1999; circulated since 1977), who
proves that any SCR that can be Nash implemented satises a remarkably strong invariance
condition, now widely referred to as Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, he shows that when
the mechanism designer faces at least three individuals, a SCR is Nash implementable if it
is Maskin monotonic and satises the condition of no veto-power, subsequently, Maskins
theorem. Maskin (1999) obtains his original result by means of a mechanism that requires
each individual to report, besides two auxiliary data, the whole description of the state.
In a preference model, this means that each participant is asked to report preferences that
members of the society have (preference prole).
Since Maskins theorem, economists have also been interested in understanding how to
circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity by exploring the possibilities
o¤ered by approximate (as opposed to exact) implementation (Matsushima, 1988; Abreu
and Sen, 1991), as well as by implementation in renements of Nash equilibrium (Moore and
Repullo, 1988; Abreu and Sen, 1990; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson, 1992) and by
repeated implementation (Kalai and Ledyard, 1998; Lee and Sabourian, 2011; Mezzetti and
Renou, 2016). One additional way around those limitations is o¤ered by implementation
with partially-honest individuals.
A partially-honest individual is an individual who deceives the mechanism designer when
the truth poses some obstacle to her material well-being. Thus, she does not deceive when
the truth is equally e¢ cacious. Simply put, a partially-honest individual follows the maxim,
Do not lie if you do not have toto serve her material interest.
In a general environment, a seminal paper on Nash implementation problems involv-
ing partially-honest individuals is Dutta and Sen (2012), whose Theorem 1 (p. 157) shows
that for implementation problems involving at least three individuals and in which there is at
least one partially-honest individual, the Nash implementability is assured by no veto-power.
Similar positive results are uncovered in other environments by Matsushima (2008a,b), Kar-
tik and Tercieux (2012), Kartik et al. (2014), Lombardi and Yoshihara (2016b,c), Saporiti
(2014) and Ortner (2015). Thus, there are far fewer limitations for Nash implementation
when there are partially-honest individuals.1
1A pioneering work on the impact of decency constraints on Nash implementation problems is Corchón
and Herrero (2004). These authors propose restrictions on sets of strategies available to agents that depend
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As in Maskins (1999) original result, Dutta and Sens (2012) Theorem 1 uses a mecha-
nism that asks participants to report, among two auxiliary data, the whole preference prole.
Moreover, according to Dutta and Sens (2012) denition of honesty, a participants play is
honest if she plays a strategy choice which is veracious in its preference prole announcement
component. In this paper, we consider weaker notions of honesty and then investigate the
robustness of Dutta and Sens (2012) Theorem 1 to these notions of truth-telling.
By taking as given any mechanism, denoted by    (M; g), and any individual is truth-
telling correspondence, denoted by T  i , the paper shows that any SCR that can be Nash
implemented with partially-honest individuals by the pair
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
satises a variant
of Maskin monotonicity, called partial-honesty monotonicity with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
.
Before describing the condition, we need additional notation. For each individual i, let
Si (
0;x; ) denote the set of truthful outcomes for individual i at the state 0 when the state
moves from  to 0 and x is selected by the SCR F at , that is, x 2 F (). Thus, the
partial-honesty monotonicity condition prescribes that if x is selected by F at  but is not
selected by F at 0 and, moreover, preferences around x are monotonically changed from
 to 0 (that is, whenever xRi ()x0, one has that xRi (
0)x0), then there is at least one
partially-honest individual h whose set of truthful outcomes Sh (
0;x; ) has the following
properties: rst, it is contained in the weak lower contour set of Rh () at x; and second,
there is a truthful outcome z 2 Sh (0;x; ) which is indi¤erent to x at her ordering Rh (0).
Finally, if, in addition, there exists a truthful outcome z0 2 Sh (0;x; ) that is indi¤erent to
x at her ordering Rh (), then individual hs set of truthful strategy choices for  di¤ers from
her set of truthful strategy choices for 0, that is, T  h () 6= T  h (0).
Every SCR is partial-honesty monotonic when it assumed that for each mechanism  ,
individual is truthful strategy choices for the state  are di¤erent from those for the state
0 whenever  6= 0. This is consistent with Theorem 1 of Dutta and Sen (2012), according
to which the partially-honest Nash implementability is assured by no veto-power when to
be honest means to report the true state of the world. This implies that if one would
like to derive a Maskin monotonicity-type condition as a necessary condition that imposes
restrictions on the class of implementable SCRs, it is bound to give a weaker meaning to the
notion of honesty.
Since the main goal of this study is to o¤er notions of honesty that are weaker than that
employed by Dutta and Sen (2012) and then to investigate the robustness of their result
to these notions, we model individual is honesty standard, denoted by S (i), as a prole
of (possibly non-empty) collections of ordered pairs of outcomes, one for each member of
on the state of the world. They refer to these strategies as decent strategies and study Nash implementa-
tion problems in decent strategies. For a particular formulation of decent strategies, they are also able to
circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity.
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society, over which individual i feels truth-telling concerns. We write S (N)  (S (i))i2N for
a typical honesty standard of society.
This notion of individual is honesty standard is exible enough to allow the individual
is collection for individual j to be empty. Our interpretation is that in this case individual
i does not have any truth-telling concern about individual j. We also adopt the view that
individual i concerns herself with at least her own self; that is, her own collection of ordered
pairs is not empty. Also, we require that the collection over which individual i feels truth-
telling concerns about herself has the property that she is able to reveal truthfully her own
complete ranking of outcomes.
Thus, an individual i is honest provided that she states her true preferences as well as
rankings (not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences
of individuals in her honesty standard. It is worth emphasizing that this notion of truth-
telling encompasses, as a special case, that of Dutta and Sen (2012).
With these notions of honesty and honesty standards, the paper shows that any SCR
that can be Nash implemented with partially-honest individuals satises a variant of Maskin
monotonicity, called S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity. The idea of this axiom is quite
intuitive. If x is one of the outcomes selected by a given SCR at state  but is not selected
when there is a monotonic change of preferences around x from  to 0, then the rankings
of outcomes in the honesty standard of a partially-honest individual has been altered by
this monotonic change. This condition implies partial-honesty monotonicity - indeed, they
are equivalent under some qualications. Furthermore, it is trivially satised when partially-
honest individuals concern themselves with the announcement of the whole preference prole
as in Dutta and Sen (2012). However, it can have more bite when weaker notions of honesty
are considered.
Indeed, in section 5, a specic type of an individual honesty standard is considered,
which is modeled as a subset of individuals involved in an implementation problem. Our
interpretation is that participant i concerns herself with the truth-telling of individuals in
her honesty standard when she plays a strategy choice. Also, this denition endorses the
view that an individual concerns herself with at least her own self. Thus, an individual i is
truthful provided that she states the true preferences of individuals in her honesty standard.
Moreover, we consider what we call non-connected honesty standards. Simply put, individual
honesty standards are connected if some participant is in the honest standard of every other
participant. When that is not the case, we call them non-connected honesty standards.
In other words, they are non-connected if every participant is excluded from the honesty
standard of another participant.
In an independent domain of preferences, where the set of the proles of participants
preferences takes the structure of the Cartesian product of individual preferences, we show
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that S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity whenever
there exists at least one partially-honest individual and individualshonesty standards are
non-connected. Thus, under those hypotheses, Maskins theorem provides an almost com-
plete characterization of SCRs that are Nash implementable in the society with partially-
honest individuals.
The remainder of the paper is divided into ve sections. Section 2 presents the theoret-
ical framework and outlines the implementation model. Section 3 presents partial-honesty
monotonicity, with the notions of truth-telling and of an honesty standard presented in sub-
section 3.1. Section 4 presents S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity, with the equivalence
result o¤ered in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Basic framework
We consider a nite set of individuals indexed by i 2 N = f1;    ; ng, which we will refer
to as a society. The set of outcomes available to individuals is X. The information held by
the individuals is summarized in the concept of a state. Write  for the domain of possible
states, with  as a typical state. In the usual fashion, individual is preferences in state  are
given by a complete and transitive binary relation, subsequently an ordering, Ri () over the
set X. The corresponding strict and indi¤erence relations are denoted by Pi () and Ii (),
respectively. The preference prole in state  is a list of orderings for individuals in N that
are consistent with this state and is denoted by RN ().
We assume that the mechanism designer does not know the true state. We assume,
however, that there is complete information among the individuals in N and that the mech-
anism designer knows the preference domain consistent with the domain . In this paper,
sometimes we identify states with preference proles.
2.2 Intrinsic preferences for honesty
An individual who has an intrinsic preference for truth-telling can be thought of as an
individual who is torn by a fundamental conict between her deeply and ingrained propensity
to respond to material incentives and the desire to think of herself as an honest person. In
this paper, the theoretical construct of the balancing act between those contradictory desires
is based on two ideas.
First, the pair ( ; ) acts as a context for individualsconicts. The reason for this
is that an individual who has an intrinsic preference for honesty can categorize her strategy
choices as truthful or untruthful relative to the state  and the mechanism   designed by
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the mechanism designer to govern the communication with individuals. That categorization
can be captured by the following notion of truth-telling correspondence:
Denition 1 For each   and each individual i 2 N , individual is truth-telling correspon-
dence is a (non-empty) correspondence T  i :   Mi. Strategy choices in T  i () will be
referred to as truthful strategy choices for .
In the following, a pair of a mechanism   and a prole of the associated truth-telling corre-
spondences
 
T  i

i2N is called a mechanism with the truth-telling correspondences (a mech-
anism, for short), and is denoted by
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
.
Second, in modeling intrinsic preferences for honesty, we endorse the notion of partially-
honest individuals introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012). First, a partially-honest individual
is an individual who responds primarily to material incentives. Second, she strictly prefers
to tell the truth whenever lying has no e¤ect on her material well-being. That behavioral
choice of a partially-honest individual can be modeled by introducing an individuals order-
ing over the strategy space M which contains the information of this individuals ordering
over X, because that individuals preference between being truthful and being untruthful
is contingent upon announcements made by other individuals as well as the outcome(s) ob-
tained from them. By following standard conventions of orderings, write <T
 
i ;
i for individual
is ordering overM in state  whenever she is confronted with the mechanism
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
.
Formally, our notion of a partially-honest individual is as follows:
Denition 2 For each
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
, individual i 2 N is partially-honest if for all  2 
individual is intrinsic preference for honesty <T
 
i ;
i on M satises the following properties:
for all m i and all mi;m0i 2Mi it holds that:
(i) If mi 2 T  i (), m0i =2 T  i () and g (m)Ri () g (m0i;m i), then m T
 
i ;
i (m
0
i;m i).
(ii) In all other cases, m <T
 
i ;
i (m
0
i;m i) if and only if g (m)Ri () g (m
0
i;m i).
An intrinsic preference for honesty of individual i is captured by the rst part of the above
denition, in that, for a given
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
and state , individual i strictly prefers the
strategy prole (mi;m i) to (m0i;m i) provided that the outcome g (mi;m i) is at least as
good as g (m0i;m i) according to her ordering Ri () and that mi is truthful for  and m
0
i is
not truthful for .
If individual i is not partially-honest, this individual cares for her material well-being
associated with outcomes of the mechanism and nothing else. Then, individual is ordering
over M is just the transposition into space M of individual is relative ranking of outcomes.
More formally:
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Denition 3 For each
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
, individual i 2 N is not partially-honest if for all  2 ,
individual is intrinsic preference for honesty <T
 
i ;
i on M satises the following property:
m <T
 
i ;
i m
0 () g (m)Ri () g (m0) , for all m;m0 2M .
2.3 Implementation problems
In formalizing the mechanism designers problem with partially-honest individuals, we
rst introduce an informational assumption and discuss its implications for our analysis. It
is:
Assumption 1 There exists at least one partially-honest individual in the society N .
Thus, in our setting, the mechanism designer only knows the set  as well as the
fact that there is at least one partially-honest individual among the individuals, but she
does not know either the true state or the identity (or identities) of the partially-honest
individual(s). Indeed, the mechanism designer cannot exclude any member(s) of society
from being partially-honest purely on the basis of Assumption 1. Therefore, the following
considerations are in order from the viewpoint of the mechanism designer.
An environment is described by two parameters, (;H): a state  and a conceivable set
of partially-honest individuals H. We denote by H a typical conceivable set of partially-
honest individuals in N , with h as a typical element, and by H the class of conceivable sets
of partially-honest individuals.
When combined with an environment (;H), each tuple
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
induces a strate-
gic game

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

, where:
<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

<T
 
i ;
i

i2N
is a prole of orderings over the strategy space M as formulated in Denition 2 and in
Denition 3. Specically, <T
 
i ;
i is individual is ordering over M as formulated in Denition
2 if individual i is in H, whereas it is the individual is ordering over M as formulated in
Denition 3 if individual i is not in H.
A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the strategic game

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

is a strategy
prole m such that for all i 2 N , it holds that
m <T
 
i ;
i (m
0
i;m i) , for all m
0
i 2Mi.
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Write NE

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

for the set of Nash equilibrium strategies of the strategic game
 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

and NA

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

for its corresponding set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes.
The following denition is to formulate the designers Nash implementation problem
involving partially-honest individuals.
Denition 4 Let Assumption 1 hold. Let the tuple
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
be given. Then, a SCR
F :  X is partially-honestly Nash implementable by
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
if it holds that
F () = NA

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

for every pair (;H) 2 H.
Moreover, whenever there exists such a tuple, we say that the SCR F is partially-honestly
Nash implementable.
The objective of the mechanism designer is thus to design a mechanism whose Nash
equilibrium outcomes coincide with F () for each state  as well as each set H. Note that
there is no distinction between the above formulation and the standard Nash implementation
problem as long as Assumption 1 is discarded.
3. Partial-honesty monotonicity with respect to


 ;
 
T  i

i2N

In his seminal paper, Maskin (1999) shows that only Maskin monotonic SCRs are Nash
implementable. Maskin monotonicity says that if an outcome x is F -optimal at the state ,
and this x does not strictly fall in preference for anyone when the state is changed to 0, then
xmust remain an F -optimal outcome at 0. An equivalent statement of Maskin monotonicity
stated above follows the reasoning that if x is F -optimal at  but not F -optimal at 0, then
the outcome x must have fallen strictly in someones ordering at the state 0 in order to
break the Nash equilibrium via some deviation. Therefore, there must exist some (outcome-
)preference reversal if an equilibrium strategy prole at  is to be broken at 0. Formally,
given a state , an individual i, and an outcome x 2 X, the weak lower contour set of Ri ()
at x is Li (; x)  fx0 2 XjxRi ()x0g. Then:
Denition 5 A SCR F :  X is Maskin monotonic provided that for all x 2 X and all
; 0 2 , if x 2 F () and Li(; x)  Li(0; x) for all i 2 N , then x 2 F (0).
When there are partially-honest individuals, Maskin monotonicity is not a necessary
condition for implementation. This is because though the strategy prole m is a Nash
equilibrium for

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

and (outcome-)preferences of each individual i change from
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Ri () to Ri (
0) in a monotonic way around g (m) (that is, whenever g (m)Ri ()x0, one has
that g (m)Ri (
0)x0), this m may fail to be a Nash equilibrium for

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;
0;H

. This
can happen when at least for one partially-honest individual h it is true that the message
prole m falls with respect to any other prole (m0h;m h) in her intrinsic preference for
honesty.
The key to our analysis is to identify the appropriate notion of monotonicity when
there are partially-honest individuals, which can be stated as follows: Given a state , an
individual i, and an outcome x 2 X, the indi¤erent contour set of Ri () at x is Ii (; x) 
fx0 2 XjxIi ()x0g. Therefore:
Denition 6 Let
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
be given. A SCR F : ! X is partial-honesty monotonic
with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
provided that for allH 2 H and all ; 0 2 , if x 2 F () nF (0)
and Li (; x)  Li (0; x) for each i 2 N , then for at least one h 2 H there exists a (non-
empty) set Sh (
0;x; )  Lh (; x) such that Sh (0;x; ) \ Ih (0; x) 6= ? holds, and:
Sh (
0;x; ) \ Ih (; x) 6= ? =) T  h () 6= T  h (0) .
Let us rst give an intuitive explanation of the set Si (
0;x; ). Suppose that F is
partially-honestly Nash implementable by
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
. Suppose that x = g (m) is F -
optimal at , that is, x 2 F (). Whilst the set g (Mi;m i) represents the set of outcomes
that individual i can generate by varying her own strategy, keeping the other individuals
equilibrium strategy choices xed at m i, the set Si (
0;x; ) = g
 
T  i (
0) ;m i

represents
the set of outcomes that this individual can attain by playing truthful strategy choices for 0
when the state moves from  to 0, keeping the other individualsequilibrium strategy choices
xed at m i. Given this idea of the set of Si (
0;x; ), we refer to elements of Si (
0;x; ) as
truthful outcomes for individual i at the state 0 when the state moves from  to 0 and x is
an F -optimal outcome at .
Thus, partial-honesty monotonicity with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
prescribes that for
each conceivable set of partially-honest individuals, H, if there exists an outcome x that
is F -optimal at  but not F -optimal at 0 and, moreover, preferences of each individual i
change from Ri () to Ri (
0) in a monotonic way around x, then only a partially-honest
individual in the given conceivable set H can break the Nash equilibrium via a unilateral
deviation. Therefore, at least for one partially-honest individual h(2 H) it is true that her
set of truthful outcomes at the state 0 when the state moves from  to 0, Sh (
0;x; ), is a
subset of the weak lower contour set of Rh () at x, and that there exists a truthful outcome
z 2 Sh (0;x; ) that is equally good to x, according to her ordering Rh (0). Finally, if, in
addition, there exists a truthful outcome z0 2 Sh (0;x; ) that is equally good to x, according
to her ordering Rh (), then individual hs set of truthful strategy choices for  di¤ers from
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her set of truthful strategy choices for 0, that is, T  h () 6= T  h (0).
For any given
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
, partial-honesty monotonicity with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
is a weaker requirement than Maskin monotonicity, with the two concepts being equivalent
under some qualications (to be discussed in section 5). Our rst main result is that this con-
dition is necessary for a SCR to be partially-honestly Nash implementable by
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
.
Theorem 1 Let Assumption 1 and
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
be given. A SCR F :   X is partial-
honesty monotonic with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
if it is partially-honestly Nash implementable
by
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
.
Proof. Let Assumption 1 and
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
be given. Suppose that a SCR F :   X
is partially-honestly Nash implementable by
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
. Thus, it holds that F
 


=
NA

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;
;H

for every pair
 
;H
 2   H. Fix any (;H) 2   H such that
x 2 F (). Thus, there is m 2 NE

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

such that g (m) = x.
Consider any state 0 2  such that
for all i 2 N and all x0 2 X : xRi ()x0 =) xRi (0)x0. (1)
If there exists an individual i 2 N such that g (m0i;m i)Pi (0) g (m), then, from (1),
g (m0i;m i)Pi () g (m) ,
a contradiction of the fact that m 2 NE

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

. Therefore, we conclude that
for all i 2 N and all m0i 2Mi : g (m)Ri (0) g (m0i;m i) . (2)
Suppose that x =2 F (0). Then, the strategy prole m is not a Nash equilibrium for
 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;
0;H

; that is, there exists an individual i 2 N who can nd a strategy choice
m0i 2Mi such that (m0i;m i) T
 
i ;
0
i m. Given that (2) holds, it must be the case that i 2 H.
From part (i) of Denition 2 we conclude, therefore, that
mi =2 T  i (0) and m0i 2 T  i (0) (3)
and that
g (m0i;m i)Ri (
0) g (m) . (4)
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For this i 2 H, let us dene the set Si (0;x; ) by
Si (
0;x; ) = g
 
T  i (
0) ;m i

. (5)
It is plain that this set is not empty - since T  i (
0) is not empty - and that Si (
0;x; ) 
Li (; x). Moreover, by (2) and (4), individual i is indi¤erent between g(m) and g (m0i;m i),
and by (3) and (5), g (m0i;m i) is an element of Si (
0;x; ). Thus, g (m0i;m i) 2 Si (0;x; )\
Ii (
0; x), which implies Si (
0;x; ) \ Ii (0; x) 6= ?.
To show the remaining property, we use a proof by contrapositive here. Assume that
T  i (
0) = T  i (). Suppose that there is a w 2 X such that w 2 Si (0;x; ) \ Ii (; x). Thus,
by denition of Si (
0;x; ) in (5), it follows that there exists m00i 2 T  i (0) = T  i () such that
g (m00i ;m i) = w and that
g (m00i ;m i) Ii () g (m) . (6)
Furthermore, since T  i (
0) = T  i (), it follows from (3) that mi =2 T  i (). Given that (6)
holds, from part (i) of Denition 2 we conclude, therefore, that m is not a Nash equilibrium
for

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;H

, which is a contradiction. Then, the intersection Si (
0;x; ) \ Ii (; x)
needs to be empty, and so F is partial-honesty monotonic.
It is worth emphasizing that partial-honesty monotonicity with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
does not impose any restriction on the class of SCRs if
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
is such that T  i () 6=
T  i (
0) for each individual i and each pair of states  and 0, with  6= 0.2 This is consistent
with Theorem 1 of Dutta and Sen (2012), according to which the partially-honest Nash
implementability is assured by no veto-power when to be honest means to report the true
state of the world.
Corollary 1 Let
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
be given. Suppose that
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
is such that T  i () 6=
T  i (
0) for all i 2 N and all ; 0 2 , with  6= 0. Then, every SCR F :  ! X is
partial-honesty monotonic with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
.
However, the condition may be stringent when for each individual i, the value of the
correspondence T  i is constrained by a weaker notion of honesty. This will be the subject of
what follows below.
3.1 Truth-telling and honesty standards
Thus, let us rst formalize our notions of truth-telling as well as individualshonesty
standards. Let the family X have as elements all non-empty subsets of the space X X as
2Note that for any ; 0 2  with x 2 F () nF  0, the set Si  0;x;  can be dened as Si  0;x;  =
Li (; x) for each i 2 N .
10
well as the set whose element is the empty set. As usual, let us denote by X n the n-fold
Cartesian product of the family X .
An honesty standard of individual i, denoted by S (i)  (Sj (i))j2N , is an element of X n
(that is, S (i) 2 X n). Whilst our interpretation of the set Sj (i) = f?jg is that individual
i does not have any truth-telling concern about individual j, our interpretation of the set
Sj (i) 6= f?jg is that individual i concerns herself about individual j and the set Sj (i)
represents the collection of ordered pairs over which this i feels truth-telling concerns - when
she plays a strategy choice. An honesty standard of society is a list of honesty standards for
all members of society. Write S (N)  (S (i))i2N for a typical honesty standard of society.
We adopt the view that individual i concerns herself with at least her own self; that
is, Si (i) 6= f?ig. Moreover, the collection Si (i) of ordered pairs over which she feels truth-
telling concerns has the property that this i is able to reveal truthfully her complete ranking
of outcomes; formally, we adopt the view that S (i) is an honesty standard of individual i
provided that
Si (i) \Ri () = Ri () for all  2 . (7)
Our interpretation of these requirements is that individual i, to view herself as an honest
person, has at least to concern herself with the truth-telling of her own preference ordering.
This also means that individual i may display an honesty standard which allows her to hide
partially or totally other individualsrankings over outcomes without that being harmful to
her self view as an honest person.
Let us observe that this formulation of an honesty standard satises important proper-
ties. First, it does not depend on the current state of the world. Second, it is also independent
of the social objectives that society or its representatives want to achieve. Last but not least,
our formulation of honesty standards do not hinge on the existence of any mechanism.
We are now in a position to state our notion of truth-telling. Formally, for a given
state  and individual is honesty standard S (i), to save notation we write RN ()\S (i) for
Rj () \ Sj (i) for each individual j. Thus:
Denition 7 For each   and each individual i 2 N with an honesty standard S (i) sat-
isfying the requirement in (7), individual is truth-telling correspondence is a (non-empty)
correspondence T  i (;S (i)) :  Mi with the property that for any two states  and 0, it
holds that
T  i (;S (i)) = T  i (0;S (i)) () RN () \ S (i) = RN (0) \ S (i) . (8)
Strategy choices in T  i (;S (i)) will be referred to as truthful strategy choices for  according
to S (i).
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According to the above denition, in a state , every truthful strategy choice of indi-
vidual i is to encode information of individualsrankings of outcomes that are consistent
with the prole of individualsorderings at the state . Moreover, if in two di¤erent states,
say  and 0, it holds that for each individual j, the set of ordered pairs in Sj (i) that are
consistent with individual js ordering at  is identical to the set of ordered pairs that are
consistent with individual js ordering at 0 (that is, Rj () \ Sj (i) = Rj (0) \ Sj (i)), then
the sets of individual is truthful strategy choices for those two states need to be identical
according to her honesty standard S (i).
The above denition of truth-telling imposes a mild restriction on the class of truth-
telling correspondences and, perhaps more interestingly, it represents a minimal notion of
honesty that one can formulate in our general environment. It is vital to emphasize here
that our notion of veracity encompasses, as a special case, that of Dutta and Sen (2012)
when each individual is honesty standard S (i) is such that Sj (i)\Rj () = Rj () for every
individual j and every state .
4. S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity
In this section, we discuss a condition, called S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity. We
show that for any given honesty standard of society summarized in S (N), this condition is
equivalent to partial-honesty monotonicity when for each mechanism  , individual is truth-
telling correspondence T  i is consistent with the conditions in Denition 7. We obtain as a
corollary of this equivalence result that S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity is a necessary
condition for the partially-honest Nash implementation when the honesty standard of society
is prescribed by S (N).
Our variant of Maskin monotonicity for Nash implementation problems involving partially-
honest individuals when the standard of honesty in a society is represented by S (N) can be
formulated as follows:
Denition 8 A SCR F :   X is S (N)-partial-honesty monotonic given the standard
S (N) (satisfying the requirement in (7) for each individual i) provided that for all x 2 X,
all H 2 H and all ; 0 2 , if x 2 F () nF (0) and Li(; x)  Li(0; x) for all i 2 N , then
there exists at least one h 2 H such that RN () \ S (h) 6= RN (0) \ S (h).
This says that if x is F -optimal at  but not F -optimal at 0 and, moreover, there is
a monotonic change of preferences around x from  to 0 (that is, whenever xRi ()x0, one
has that xRi (
0)x0), then the rankings of outcomes in the honesty standard of a partially-
honest individual h has been altered by this monotonic change (that is, RN () \ S (h) 6=
RN (
0)\S (h)). Stated in the contrapositive, this says that if x is F -optimal at  and there
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is a monotonic change of preferences around x from  to 0 and, moreover, the rankings of
outcomes in the honesty standard of every partially-honest individual h in H has not been
altered by this monotonic change, then x must continue to be one of the outcomes selected
by F at the state 0.3
Remark 1 Note that if each individual is honesty standard S (i) is such that Sj (i) \
Rj () = Rj (), for every individual j and every state , and if x is F -optimal at  but not
F -optimal at 0 and it happens that the lower contour sets of preferences at x are nested for
every agent across the two environments, then one has that RN () 6= RN (0). Thus, any
SCR is S (N)-partial-honesty monotonic whenever the honesty standard of society is that
studied by Dutta and Sen (2012).
Note that the above denitions of partially-honest individuals (that is, Denition 2)
as well as of partially-honest Nash implementation can be easily adapted to the environ-
ments with honesty standards. Now, a pair
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
and an environment with honesty
standards (;S (N) ; H) induce a strategic game

 ;<(T
 
i )i2N ;;S(N);H

, where:
<(T
 
i )i2N ;;S(N);H

<T
 
i ;;S(i)
i

i2N
is a prole of orderings over the strategy space M as formulated in Denition 2 and in De-
nition 3 where the truth-telling correspondence of individual i is that provided in Denition
7. Also, note that the notion of implementation of Denition 4 can easily be adapted to the
environments with honesty standards - where every individuals truth-telling correspondence
meets the requirements of Denition 7.
Our second main result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 2 Let the honesty standard of society be summarized in S (N), where every in-
dividual honesty standard satises the requirement in (7). For each mechanism  , let the
truth-telling correspondence T  i of individual i be consistent with the conditions in Denition
7. Then, for any
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
, partial-honesty monotonicity with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
is equivalent to S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity.
Proof. Let the premises hold. Assume that the SCR F :   X is S (N)-partial-honesty
monotonic. We show that for any
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
, it is partial-honesty monotonic with respect
to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
, too. For each individual i, for each  such that x 2 F () and each
0, let us dene the set Si (
0;x; ) by Si (
0;x; ) = Li(; x). Thus, for each individual i,
Si (
0;x; )\ Ii (0; x) 6= ?, and x 2 Si (0;x; )\ Ii (; x) holds for all  and 0 with x 2 F ().
3Note that Remark 1 could also be seen as a direct consequence of Corollary 1 when one sets Si
 
0;x; 

=
Li (; x) and T i () = S (i) \RN () = RN () for each individual i.
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Fix any H 2 H. Take any  and 0 such that x 2 F () nF (0). Furthermore, let us
suppose that Li(; x)  Li(0; x) for each individual i. Since F is S (N)-partial-honesty
monotonic, it implies that RN () \ S (h) 6= RN (0) \ S (h) for at least one h 2 H. This
means that T  h (;S (h)) 6= T  h (0;S (h)) for at least one h 2 H, as we sought. Thus, for anyD
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
, F is partial-honesty monotonic with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
.
To show the converse relation, assume that F is partial-honesty monotonic with respect
to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
. Fix any H. Take any  and 0 such that x 2 F () nF (0) and suppose
that Li(; x)  Li(0; x) for each individual i. Suppose that F does not satisfy S(N)-partial-
honest monotonicity. That is, suppose that, for any i 2 H, RN () \ S(i) = RN (0) \
S(i). Since the truth-telling correspondences  T  i i2N are consistent with the conditions
in Denition 7, it follows that T  i (;S (i)) = T  i (0;S (i)) for each i 2 H. Partial-honesty
monotonicity with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
implies that for at least one h 2 H, it holds
that Sh (
0;x; ) \ Ih (0; x) is not empty. Since T  i (;S (i)) = T  i (0;S (i)), partial-honesty
monotonicity with respect to
D
 ;
 
T  i

i2N
E
also implies that Sh (
0;x; )\ Ih (; x) is empty.
However, since RN () \ S(h) = RN (0) \ S(h), requirement (7) implies that Rh () =
Rh (
0), and so Ih (
0; x) = Ih (; x). Since Sh (
0;x; )\ Ih (0; x) is not empty, it follows that
Sh (
0;x; )\ Ih (; x) is not empty, which is a contradiction. Thus, F satises S(N)-partial-
honest monotonicity.
As a corollary of this theorem, we obtain that S(N)-partial-honest monotonicity is
necessary for partially-honest Nash implementation. This is because if x is F -optimal at
 but not F -optimal at 0 and, moreover, the outcome x has not fallen strictly in any
individuals ordering at the state 0, then only a partially-honest individual in the given
conceivable set H can break the Nash equilibrium via a unilateral deviation. Therefore,
there must exist a partially-honest individual h 2 H whose equilibrium strategy to attain
x at (;S (N) ; H) is not a truthful strategy choice at (0;S (N) ; H). This means that
RN () \ S (h) 6= RN (0) \ S (h), according to Denition 7.
Corollary 2 Let Assumption 1 be given. Let the honesty standard of society be summarized
in S (N), where every individual honesty standard satises the requirement in (7). For each
mechanism  , let the truth-telling correspondence T  i of individual i be consistent with the
conditions in Denition 7. Then, a SCR F :   X is S (N)-partial-honesty monotonic
given the standard S (N) if it is partially-honestly Nash implementable.
5. Equivalence result
The classic paper on Nash implementation theory is Maskin (1999), which shows that
where the mechanism designer faces a society involving at least three individuals, a SCR
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is Nash implementable if it is Maskin monotonic and satises the auxiliary condition of no
veto-power.4
The condition of no veto-power says that if an outcome is at the top of the preferences
of all individuals but possibly one, then it should be chosen irrespective of the preferences
of the remaining individual; that individual cannot veto it. Formally:5
Denition 9 A SCR F :  X satises no veto-power provided that for all  2  and all
x 2 X, if
jfi 2 N jX  Li (; x)gj  n  1,
then x 2 F ().
Proposition 1 (Maskins Theorem, 1999) If n  3 and F :   X is a SCR satisfying
Maskin monotonicity and no veto-power, then it is Nash implementable.
In a general environment such as that considered here, a seminal paper on Nash imple-
mentation problems involving partially-honest individuals is Dutta and Sen (2012). It shows
that for Nash implementation problems involving at least three individuals and in which
there is at least one partially-honest individual, the Nash implementability is assured by no
veto-power (Dutta and Sen, 2012; p. 157). From the perspective of this paper, Dutta-Sens
notion of truth-telling and their Theorem 1 can be formally restated as follows.
We have already mentioned that our notion of truth-telling encompasses, as a special
case, that of Dutta and Sen (2012) provided that each individual is honesty standard S (i) is
such that Sj (i)\Rj () = Rj () for every individual j and every state . As a generalization
of Dutta and Sens (2012) honesty standard, let us consider a specic type of an honesty
standard S (i) of each individual i such that:
for any j 2 N , Sj (i) 6=

?j
	
implies Sj (i) \Rj () = Rj () for every state .
Such a type of honesty standard ensures the existence of a subgroup of society, denoted by
S (i), such that j 2 S (i) if and only if Sj (i) \ Rj () = Rj () for every state . In this
section, we focus our attention to this type of honesty standards for all individuals. To
ease notation, in what follows we can denote an honesty standard of individual i by S (i).
Thus, given a state , RS(i) () is a list of orderings consistent with  for individuals in
the honesty standard S (i) of individual i. Our interpretation is that participant i concerns
herself with the truth-telling of preferences of individuals in her honesty standard when she
4Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), Sjöström (1991) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013)
rened Maskins theorem by providing necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an SCR to be implementable in
(pure strategies) Nash equilibrium. For an introduction to the theory of implementation see Jackson (2001),
Maskin and Sjöström (2002) and Serrano (2004).
5For any nite set S, jSj denotes the cardinality of S.
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plays a strategy choice. To capture the requirement in (7), our denition endorses the view
that an individual concerns herself with at least her own self; that is, i 2 S (i).
Furthermore, given that in Dutta-Sens Theorem 1 the mechanism designer knows the
honesty standard of society, denoted by S (N)  (S (i))i2N , we also need the following
information assumption in order to state their result from the perspective of this paper.
Assumption 2 The mechanism designer knows the honesty standard of the society N .
Therefore:
Proposition 2 (Dutta-Sens Theorem 1, 2012) Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 be
given. Let the honesty standard of society be summarized in S (N), where S (i)  N for all
i 2 N . If n  3 and F :  X is a SCR satisfying no veto-power, then it is partially-honestly
Nash implementable.
It follows from Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 that any SCR is S (N)-partial-honesty
monotonic whenever the honesty standard of society is such that every individual consid-
ers truthful only messages that encode the whole truth about preferences of individuals in
society, that is, S (i) = N for all i 2 N .
That is a particular kind of honesty standards of individuals but there is no reason to
restrict attention to such standards. Thus, in what follows, we are interested in understand-
ing the kind of honesty standards of individuals which would make it impossible for the
mechanism designer to circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity. To this
end, let us introduce the following notion of standards of honesty of a society.
Denition 10 Given a society N involving at least two individuals, an honesty standard of
this society is said to be non-connected if and only if for all i 2 N , i =2 S (j) for some j 2 N .
Given that the honesty standard of individual i includes the individual herself, by def-
inition of S (i), the honesty standard of society is non-connected whenever every one of its
members is excluded from the honesty standard of another member of the society. Simply
put, members of a society do not concern themselves with the same individual.
It is self-evident that the kind of honesty standards in Dutta-Sens theorem are not
non-connected because every individual of the society is interested in telling the truth about
the whole society. As another example of honesty standards of a society that are not non-
connected, consider a three-individual society where individual 1 concerns herself with herself
and with individual 2 (that is, S (1) = f1; 2g), individual 2 concerns herself with everyone
(that is, S (2) = f1; 2; 3g) and, nally, individual 3 concerns herself with herself and with
individual 1 (that is, S (3) = f1; 3g). The honesty standard of this three-individual society
is not non-connected because everyone concerns themselves with individual 1.
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Moreover, it is not necessarily true that every non-connected honesty standard of society
implies that every individual honesty standard be of the form S (i) 6= N , as we demonstrate
with the next example. Consider a three-individual society where individual 1 is concerned
only with herself (that is, S (1) = f1g), individual 2 with everyone (that is, S (2) = f1; 2; 3g)
and individual 3 with herself and with individual 2 (that is, S (3) = f2; 3g). The honesty
standard of this society is non-connected given that individual 2 and individual 3 are both
excluded from the honesty standard of individual 1 and individual 1 is excluded from the
honesty standard of individual 3.
As is the case here, the above denition is a requirement for the honesty standard of a
society that is su¢ cient for S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity to be equivalent to Maskin
monotonicity when two further assumptions are satised. The rst assumption requires that
the family H includes singletons. This requirement is innocuous given that the mechanism
designer cannot exclude any individual from being partially-honest purely on the basis of
Assumption 1.
The second requirement is that the set of states  takes the structure of the Cartesian
product of allowable independent characteristics for individuals. More formally, the domain
 is said to be independent if it takes the form
 =
Y
i2N
i,
where i is the domain of allowable independent characteristics for individual i, with i
as a typical element. A typical example of an independent domain is that each i simply
represents the domain of the preference orderings over X of individual i and so the domain
of the proles of all individualspreference orderings on X has the structure of the Cartesian
product. In such a case, in a state  = (i)i2N , individual is preference ordering over X
depends solely on individual is independent characteristic i rather than on the prole .
The above requirements lead to the following conclusion:
Theorem 3 Let N be a society involving at least two individuals,  be an independent
domain and H include singletons. Suppose that the honesty standard of the society, de-
noted by S (N), is non-connected. Then, S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity is equivalent
to Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Let n  2,  be an independent domain and H include singletons. Let S (N)
be a non-connected honesty standard of N . One can see that Maskin monotonicity implies
S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity.
For the converse, consider any SCR F :   X satisfying S (N)-partial-honesty
monotonicity. Consider any x 2 X and any state  2  such that x is an F -optimal
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outcome at . Moreover, consider any state 0 such that individualspreferences change in a
Maskin monotonic way around x from  to 0, that is,
for all i 2 N and all x0 2 X : xRi ()x0 =) xRi (0)x0.
We show that x remains F -optimal at 0.
If characteristics of individuals in the honesty standard of individual i 2 N are identical
in the two states, that is, RS(i) () = RS(i) (
0), S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity for the
case H = fig assures that x is still F -optimal at 0. Thus, let us consider the case RS(i) () 6=
RS(i) (
0) for every individual i 2 N .
To economize notation, for any subset K of N , write KC for the complement of K in
N . Therefore, for any non-empty subset K of N , we can write any non-trivial combination
of the states  and 0 as
 
K ; 
0
KC

, where it is understood that K is a list of characteristics
of individuals in K at the state  and 0KC is a list of characteristics of individuals in KC
at 0. Note that any state that results by that combination is available in  because of its
product structure.
Given that the honesty standard of society is non-connected, there must be an individual
j (1) 2 N who does not concern herself with the whole society, that is, S (j (1)) 6= N .
Consider the state 
K(1); 
0
K(1)C

where K (1)  S (j (1)) ,
and call it 1. By construction, individualspreferences change in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from  to 1 and, moreover, K(1) = 
1
K(1). S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity for
the case H = fj (1)g assures that the x remains an F -optimal outcome at 1.
If there is an individual i 2 Nn fj (1)g who is not concerned with any of the individuals
in the honesty standard of individual j (1), that is, the intersection S (i)\S (j (1)) is empty,
then S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity for the case H = fig assures that x is still F -
optimal at 0. This is because, by construction, individualspreferences change in a Maskin
monotonic way around x from 1 to 0 and 1S(i) = 
0
S(i).
Thus, consider any individual j (2) 2 Nn fj (1)g, and denote by K (2) the set of indi-
viduals with whom individual j (1) and individual j (2) are jointly concerned according to
their individual honesty standards. Furthermore, consider the state
K(2); 
0
K(2)C

where K (2)  K (1) \ S (j (2)) ,
and call it 2. By construction, individualspreferences change in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from 1 to 2 and, moreover, 1S(j(2)) = 
2
S(j(2)). S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity
for the case H = fj (2)g assures that x remains an F -optimal outcome at 2.
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If there is an individual i 2 Nn fj (1) ; j (2)g who is not concerned with any of the
individuals with whom individuals j (1) and j (2) are jointly concerned, S (N)-partial-honesty
monotonicity for the case H = fig assures that x is also F -optimal at 0. This is because,
by construction, individualspreferences change in a Maskin monotonic way around x from
2 to 0 and 2S(i) = 
0
S(i).
Thus, consider any individual j (3) 2 Nn fj (1) ; j (2)g, and denote by K (3) the set of
individuals with whom individuals j (1), j (2) and j (3) are jointly concerned according to
their individual honesty standards. Furthermore, consider the state
K(3); 
0
K(3)C

where K (3)  K (2) \ S (j (3)) ,
and call it 3. By construction, individualspreferences change in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from 2 to 3 and, moreover, 2S(j(3)) = 
3
S(j(3)). S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity
for the case H = fj (3)g assures that x remains an F -optimal outcome at 3.
As above, if there is an individual i 2 Nn fj (1) ; j (2) ; j (3)g who is not concerned
with any of the individuals with whom individuals j (1), j (2) and j (3) are jointly con-
cerned, S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity for the case H = fig assures that x remains
also F -optimal at 0, because, by construction, individualspreferences change in a Maskin
monotonic way around x from 3 to 0 and 3S(i) = 
0
S(i). And so on.
Since the society N is a nite set and the above iterative reasoning is based on its
cardinality, we are left to show that it must stop at most after n  1 iterations.
To this end, suppose that we have reached the start of the n   1th iteration. Thus,
consider any individual j (n  1) 2 N , with j (n  1) 6= j (r) for r = 1;    ; n 2, and denote
by K (n  1) the set of individuals with whom individuals j (1), j (2) ;    ; j (n  2) and
j (n  1) are jointly concerned according to their individual honesty standards. Furthermore,
consider the state
K(n 1); 
0
K(n 1)C

where K (n  1)  K (n  2) \ S (j (n  1)) ,
and call it n 1. As above, by construction, individualspreferences change in a Maskin
monotonic way around x from n 2 

K(n 2); 
0
K(n 2)C

to n 1 and, moreover, n 2S(j(n 1)) =
n 1S(j(n 1)). S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity for the case H = fj (n  1)g assures that x is
an F -optimal outcome at n 1.
At this stage there is only one individual inN who is left to be considered. Call her j (n).
Suppose that this individual is concerned with one of the individuals for whom individuals
j (1), j (2) ;    ; j (n  2) and j (n  1) are jointly concerned. In other words, suppose that
the intersection K (n  1) \ S (j (n)) is non-empty. Then, the whole society concerns itself
with one of its member, and this contradicts the fact that the honesty standard of society
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is non-connected. Therefore, it must be the case that individual j (n) is not concerned
with any of the individuals with whom individuals j (1), j (2) ;    ; j (n  2) and j (n  1)
are jointly concerned according to their individual honesty standards. S (N)-partial-honesty
monotonicity for the case H = fj (n)g assures that x remains also F -optimal at 0 given
that, by construction, individualspreferences change in a Maskin monotonic way around x
from n 1 to 0 and n 1S(j(n)) = 
0
S(j(n)).
The iterative reasoning would stop at the rth (< n  1) iteration if there were an indi-
vidual i 2 Nn fj (1) ;    ; j (r)g who was not concerned with any of the individuals in K (r),
that is, if the intersection S (i) \K (r) were empty. If that were the case, then the desired
conclusion could be obtained by invoking S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity for H = fig
because, by construction, it would hold that individualspreferences change in a Maskin
monotonic way around x from r to 0 and that rS(i) = 
0
S(i).
Each of the requirements of Theorem 3 is indispensable. This can be seen as follows:
Consider a two-individual society where is the set of states andX is the set of outcomes
available to individuals. Let S (i) be the honesty standard of individual i = 1; 2. Consider
an outcome x and a state  such that x is an F -optimal outcome at . Consider any other
state 0 such that individualspreferences change in a Maskin monotonic way around x from
 to 0. Maskin monotonicity says that x must continue to be an F -optimal outcome at 0.
To avoid trivialities, let us focus on the case that  6= 0, which means that RN () 6= RN (0),
given that we identify states with preference proles.
If every individual were concerned with the whole society, we could never invoke (the
contrapositive of) S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity to conclude that x should remain F -
optimal at 0 because RN () 6= RN (0). Furthermore, consider the case that individual 1
concerns herself with only herself, that is, S (1) = f1g, while individual 2 concerns herself
with the whole society, that is, S (2) = f1; 2g. Reasoning such as the one just used shows that
S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity cannot be invoked if R1 () 6= R1 (0). The argument for
honesty standards of the form S (1) = f1; 2g and S (2) = f2g is symmetric. Thus, the
only case left to be considered is the one in which everyone concerns themselves with only
themselves, that is, S (i) = fig for i = 1; 2. In this situation, the honesty standard of society
is reduced to the non-connected one. Note that the standards considered earlier were not
non-connected.
Suppose that preferences of individual 1 are identical in the two states, that is, R1 () =
R1 (
0). To conclude that x should be F -optimal at 0 by invoking S (N)-partial-honesty
monotonicity we need to nd individual 1 in the family H. The argument for the case
R2 () = R2 (
0) is symmetric. Thus, if Ri () = Ri (
0) for one of the individuals, the
requirement that the singleton fig is an element of H is needed for the completion of the
argument.
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Suppose that preferences of individuals are not the same in the two states, that is,
Ri () 6= Ri (0) for every individual i, though they have changed in a Maskin monotonic
way around x from the state  to 0. In this case, one cannot directly reach the conclu-
sion of Maskin monotonicity by invoking S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity. One way to
circumvent the problem is to be able to nd a feasible state 00 with the following proper-
ties: i) individualspreferences change in a Maskin monotonic way around x from  to 00
and Ri () = Ri (
00) for an individual i, and ii) individualspreferences change in that way
around x from 00 to 0 and Rj (
0) = Rj (
00) for individual j 6= i. A domain  that assures
the existence of such a state is the independent domain.
Even if one were able to nd such a state 00 by requiring an independent product
structure of , one could not invoke S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity to conclude that x
must continue to be an F -optimal outcome at 0 whenever the family H did not have the
appropriate structure. This can be seen as in the following argument.
Suppose that  is an independent domain. Then, states take the form of proles of
individualscharacteristics, that is,  = (1; 2) and 
0 = (01; 
0
2). Moreover, the characteristic
of individual i in one state is independent from the characteristic of the other individual.
That is, Ri () = Ri (i) and Ri (
0) = Ri (
0
i) for every individual i. The product structure
of  assures that the states (1; 
0
2) and (
0
1; 2) are both available and each of them has the
properties summarized above.
Next, suppose that the family H has a structure given by ff1g ; f1; 2gg. One can invoke
S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity for H = f1g to obtain that x is one of the outcomes
chosen by the SCR F at (1; 
0
2) when the state changes from  to (1; 
0
2), but he cannot
conclude that x remains also F -optimal at 0 when it changes from (1; 
0
2) to 
0. The reason
is that S (N)-partial-honesty monotonicity cannot be invoked again for the case H = f2g
because the structure of the family H does not contemplate such a case. The argument for
the case that H takes the form ff2g ; f1; 2gg is symmetric.
In light of Corollary 2 and Maskins theorem, the main implications of Theorem 3 can
be formally stated as follows:
Corollary 3 Let N be a society involving at least two individuals,  be an independent
domain and H include singletons. Suppose that the honesty standard S (N) of the society is
non-connected. Let Assumption 1 be given. Then, a SCR F :  X is Maskin monotonic
if it is partially-honestly Nash implementable.
Corollary 4 Let N be a society involving at least three individuals,  be an independent
domain and H include singletons. Suppose that the honesty standard S (N) of the society
is non-connected. Let Assumption 1 be given. Then, a SCR F :   X satisfying no
veto-power is partially-honestly Nash implementable if and only if it is Maskin monotonic.
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Remark 2 In a related but not identical setting, Kartik and Tercieux (2012) study Nash im-
plementation problems where agents can choose to provide evidence as part of their strategies.
In this setup, they show that any social choice function satisfying a weaker variant of Maskin
monotonicity, called evidence-monotonicity, and no veto-power is Nash implementable. In
an environment where there are partially-honest individuals, they show that even small in-
trinsic costs of lying create a substantial wedge between evidence-monotonicity and Maskin
monotonicity, in the sense that every social choice function is evidence-monotonic. Under
the assumptions of Theorem 3 and suitable specications which resemble those of Example
2 in Kartik and Tercieux (2012; p. 333), one can show that this wedge disappears when
participants are allowed/forced to produce partial evidence of the true state according to a
non-connected (evidence) standard S(N).6
6. Concluding remarks
The assumption that the mechanism designer knows the honesty standard of society is
often not met in reality, although it may be plausible in societies with a small number of
individuals in which the mechanism designer knows their sensitivity to honesty. Outside of
cases like those, we view as more plausible the assumption that the mechanism designer only
knows the types of honesty standards shared by individuals. Does the conclusion of Theorem
3 change in this case? The answer is no. After all, if individuals are honesty-sensitive, the
mechanism designer can test for connectedness of their honesty standards. If the test fails,
it would be in vain for him to attempt to Nash implement any SCR that is not Maskin
monotonic. The reason for it is easy to identify: the fact that he solely knows that the
honesty standard of society is non-connected can only make implementation harder than if
the actual non-connected honesty standards of participants were known.
Theorem 3 is derived on the basis that in every state a strategy choice of an individual
is truthful if it encodes information of individualspreferences consistent with that state for
members of society in her honesty standard. This implies that if we arrange agents in a
6To see it, let us suppose that individuals have separable preferences in the sense of Kartik and Tercieux
(2012; p. 238). That is, suppose that each agents (extended) preference ordering Ri () over the outcome-
evidence space X  Ei is represented by a utility function of the form Ui (x; ei; ) = ui (a; )   ci (ei; ),
where ci (ei; ) represents agent is cost of producing evidence ei. Fix any S (N) and let the domain  be
independent. For each individual i, let the evidence space be Ei =
Q
j2S(i)
j . Fix any set H. For each h 2 H,
let the cost function be ch
 
; 0

= 0 if RS(h) () = RS(h)
 
0

, otherwise, ch
 
; 0

= " > 0, where " can be
arbitrarly small. For each i =2 H, let ci
 
; 0

= 0 for every  and 0. This structure implies that the set of
the least-evidence cost for h 2 H given the pair (x; ) is E`h (x; ) =

S(h)
	
while it is E`i (x; ) = Ei for
every i =2 H. Let the evidence function of invididual h 2 H be eh () =

RS(h) ()
	
for every  2 . Under
these specications, one can now see from the proof of Theorem 3 that evidence-monotonicity (stated for
each H 2 H) is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity.
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directed circle and ask them to report their own preferences and those of their successors in
the circle, and the honesty standard of every individual includes herself and her successors,7
then this simplermechanism would impair the ability of the mechanism designer to escape
the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity. Then, a natural question that arises im-
mediately is: Under what conditions would the positive result of Dutta and Sen (2012) be
restored? We answer this question in a companion paper (Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2016a)
and it is as follows: The mechanism designer who knows that ( 1) members of society have
a taste for honesty can expect to do well if no participant has a veto-power by structuring
communication with participants in a way that each of them reports her own preference and
those of other n   successors who are in her honesty standard.
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991)
have shown that Maskins theorem can be generalized to Bayesian environments. A neces-
sary condition for Bayesian Nash implementation is Bayesian monotonicity. In a Bayesian
environment involving at least three individuals, Bayesian monotonicity combined with no
veto-power is su¢ cient for Bayesian Nash implementation provided that a necessary condi-
tion called closure and the Bayesian incentive compatibility condition are satised (Jackson,
1991). Although the implementation model developed in this paper needs to be modied
to handle Bayesian environments, we believe a similar equivalence result holds in those en-
vironments for suitably dened communication schemes (on this point, see Lombardi and
Yoshihara, 2013; section 5). This subject is left for future research.
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